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In recent years, the price of Chinese housing commodity is temperature-elevating 
overall, the superheat phenomenon presented in some areas, and the market appeared 
some questions involve the industrial healthy development, they are: the investment 
grows excessively quickly, the supplies structure was unreasonable, the increase 
scope of house price oversized, the vacant area increased unceasingly and so on. 
Meanwhile，The Chinese real estate market has also experienced all sorts of policies 
just like the roller coaster. First is the deadline of land on 8•31, and what came after 
were “The eight policies about the limitation of real estate” and “the opinion” issued 
by the seven ministries and commissions, as well as the continual readjustment on 
bank loan interest rate, then is the “six policies about the limitation of real estate’ 
announced in 2006”, and so on. Is the macroeconomic regulation and control effect on 
Chinese real estate market really realized as anticipated under the policy baptism? 
Certainly, to realize a health, stable and order development in the Chinese real estate 
market, it needs a process. But looked on at present, although the increased range of 
house price has recedes under the policy high pressure, the rising tendency is still not 
reduced, the speculative house-buying increases steadily, the supply of 
indemnificatory housing and land is vacancy, the supplies structure contradictory is 
still prominent, and  most inhabitants still faced house-purchasing difficulty. 
Obviously, the high-speed growth of Chinese various municipal housing price could 
not be explained well just by economical fundamental plane and the short of demand, 
the history data analysis also demonstrated that the housing price has already 
enormously deviated the long-term equilibrium value, Chinese housing market has 
been at the condition that the market malfunction and the price expire at quite a 
degree. 
The industrial control and the price regulations are the intervention behavior 
based on the market malfunction under government, which are the market economy 













rational movement track. The quality of our country’s real estate market development 
is very important for the common people to enjoy a good and prosperous life , but in 
recent years the housing market development is neither suitable for “living in 
contentment” nor suitable for “being content with one's occupation”, this ,to certain 
extent, is related to the value orientation of local authority's on land supplies and the 
housing market’s monopolized supplies. Presently, the government meet different 
views coming from the theorists and the practice department's on whether to regulate 
housing market, supposing that the price control or the regulations belong to the 
planned economy not the market economy, and we should not intervene the product 
supplies and the fixed price behavior of the developer. This idea ,under the group's 
special interest of the housing market strengthening, has formed the market control 
strength, causing certain negative influence on formulation and implementation of the 
government industry regulations policy. Without unified views, the housing market 
regulations policy of government does not arrive, or some feasible industrial 
regulations measure has also far not achieved the anticipated effect, even causes the 
policy to the expiration and “the regulations malfunction” condition. Therefore, we 
have the necessity to comb systematically and theoretically the phenomenon and the 
origin of the real estate market malfunction, inquire into the housing industry 
microscopic regulations mechanism, which can enrich the housing industry 
economical regulations theory, provide the solid rationale and the feasibility 
suggestion for the government to carry on the economical regulations of the housing 
price , favor the adjustment of our country's housing industry regulations policy, 
improve industry supervising and managing method and the management way, and 
change the former condition “no matter chaotic, dies”. 
This article explores the following several aspects for innovation.(1) Taking the 
theories and methods of Regulation Economics and Industrial Organization as our 
instruction, we study the government regulation  mechanism of China’s housing 
market comprehensively and systematically. Combining with the new characteristics 














situation, reason, monopoly structure ,information unsymmetry and land supply under  
China’s price regulation of housing market, and so on. In this foundation, we design 
the frame of government regulations and price regulation models of various kinds of 
housing. The research makes efforts to be close to the reality of China’s housing 
market, and the empirical analysis is even more realistic.(2) The article simulates the 
economy reality of China’s housing market by using game model, constructs game 
models for price separately between  central and  local government, government 
and enterprise, different enterprises as well as enterprise and consumers, analyzes 
their equilibrium, and seeks the formation mechanism of housing price and the 
validity of government policy about price regulations with a new angle of view.(3) 
We design the relatively independent frame of economic regulations about China’s 
housing market for the first time,and the frame of govenment economic regulations 
basing on the market economy system between transition period from some aspects, 
such as legislation for regulation, surveillance system of regulation, regulation fund 
and so on.(4) We construct dual regulation model of commodity housing price and 
prompting competitive  bidding  pattern of price-limited house in dual price for the 
first time.We also restructure the price regulation model of indemnificatory housing. 
In this paper, the main viewpoint and conclusions is:（1）From the overall 
situation of the entire political and economic society, Central government should 
restrict the interests of local government on the unlimited expansion of the land 
market, and take game balanced supply of premium regulation modular approach to 
achieve stable development of the land-value.(2)The monopoly structure of housing 
market and the difference of product cause the market to appear to be weak 
price-competitive . The policy to reduce the price by making supplies bigger than 
demands is invalid，which only can bring more vacant area and lower entersrate, and 
hide the danger of the supply surplus for the market.(3)The asymmetric information of 
residential market leads to highly price risen preference in market parties involved 
and non-rational balanced market. In order to create a healthy sequential equilibrium 













for guilty of “profiteering”. (4)Considering the out of status in residential market, it is 
necessary for government to build housing industry economic regulation law and 
organizational structure, to practice the dual price economic regulation system in the 
residential market to focus on long-term regulation mechanisms.(5)By legislation and 
system design, government must build housing supply classification system for low 
and middle revenue oriented people, to solve the problem of structural imbalances in 
the supply of domestic markets. (6)Government should build the two-stage bidding 
economic regulation system based on biding for the right to develop the concession, 
and explore various forms of housing price, house security prices and rates of 
economic regulation in order to ensure the quality of residential construction. 
Due to the problems involved more papers and my knowledge, inevitably flawed, 
pending further study and improvement. 
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